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Personal and corporate liability in the
aftermath of bird strikes: a costly
consideration
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Abstract: This paper details liability issues inherent in bird–aircraft collisions (bird-strike)
incidents at airports and discusses how airport managers and operators must strive to conduct
accurate assessments and develop and implement an effective wildlife management plan.
Such efforts are mandated by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, and failure to
follow them may result in loss of human life and property, as well as large financial penalties
for managers and operators and adverse media attention and public criticism for the airport
authority.
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Each year, the aviation industry is faced
with the potential for extensive loss of life and
property due to birds colliding with aircraft
(bird strikes). As many species of birds compete
for airspace with departing and approaching
aircraft at airports worldwide, resulting bird
strikes contribute to a substantial jeopardy to
the safety record and financial well-being of
airport operators and their managers (Dolbeer
and Wright 2009, Dove et al. 2009, Klope et al.
2009). The Federal Aviation Administration
Wildlife Strike Database, compiled by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, documents the
widespread and diverse nature of this problem.
A total of 82,057 wildlife strike reports (98%
involving birds) from 1,418 U.S. airports and 207
foreign airports has been entered for the period
January 1990 through December 2007, with
7,666 strikes occurring in 2007. Sandra Wright,
manager of the FAA Wildlife Strike Database,
estimates that 80% of wildlife–aircraft strikes
go unreported (Wright 2008).
In the past, federal, state, and provincial
wildlife
management
programs
have
contributed to population increases in largebodied birds, such as cormorants (Phalacrocorax
spp.), cranes (Grus spp.), geese (Branta spp.),
gulls (Larus spp.), herons (e.g., Ardea herodias),
pelicans (Pelecanus spp.), raptors (e.g., hawks
[Buteo spp.]), owls (Bubo spp., Strix spp.),
eagles (Haliaeetus spp., Aquila spp.; Figure 1),
vultures (Cathartes spp., Coragyps spp.), and
wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo; Cleary and
Dolbeer 2005). Wildlife strikes cost the U.S.
civil aviation industry approximately $500
million and commercial air carriers worldwide

>$1.2 billion annually. More than 194 people
have died, and 164 aircraft have been destroyed
as a result of bird and other wildlife strikes
with civil and military aircraft from 1988 to
2004 (Richardson and West 2000, Thorpe 2003,
Cleary et al. 2004).
The frequency and devastating consequences
of bird strikes dictate that airport operators
and managers must address the issues of
organizational and personal liability. Airport
managers and operators are being sued
personally for human injuries and death, as
well as property damage, in the aftermath
of bird strikes. Further, regulatory agencies
are using their law enforcement divisions to
enforce permitting regulations to the extent that
airport managers can face civil and criminal
prosecution for violating federal regulation or
taking either inappropriate action or no action
at all to mitigate wildlife strikes. In such cases,
liability may extend to members of the airport’s
governing body. Moreover, the expenses for
the ensuing legal defense are high. This paper
details liability issues inherent in bird-strike
incidents and discusses how airport managers
must conduct accurate assessments and
develop and implement an effective wildlife
damage management plan, as directed by FAA
regulations (FAA 2004).

Defining liability

The majority of wildlife strikes occurs within
the immediate airport environment, and 74%
of all strikes happens ≤152 m above ground
level (Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Airports must
be managed to be as unattractive to birds as
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Figure 1. Raptors, such as this American bald eagle perched atop an airport runway sign at the Orlando
Sanford International Airport, Florida, are among the birds that may pose a threat to aviation.

possible. The goal of wildlife managers on and
around airports is to eliminate or minimize
the carrying capacity of habitat for species
that are hazardous to aviation (Cleary and
Dolbeer 2005). Airport managers must accept
the responsibility of implementing a wildlife
damage management plan and carry out the
many different aspects of such a plan that will
make it successful.
One of the most common liabilities to the airport manager is his failure to take the appropriate actions that are legally required. Airport
sponsors and managers have a responsibility
under federal regulations (FAA 2004) to
ensure the airport maintains a safe operating
environment. They must take immediate action
to alleviate wildlife hazards whenever they
are detected. They must ensure that a wildlife
hazard assessment is conducted when any of the
following events occurs on or near the airport:
1. An aircraft experiences a multiple
wildlife strike;
2. An aircraft experiences substantial
damage from striking wildlife;
3. An aircraft experiences an engine
ingestion of wildlife; and
4. Wildlife capable of causing damage is
observed to have access to any airport
flight pattern or aircraft movement
area (Cleary and Dolbeer 2005).

If any one of these events occurs, the
airport operator must begin a wildlife hazard
assessment to be conducted by a qualified
wildlife damage management biologist over
a 12-month period (FAA 2004). If the FAA
determines that a wildlife hazard management
plan is needed, the airport operator must then
formulate and implement one using the wildlife
hazard assessment as its basis (FAA 2004,
Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). If federally listed or
proposed endangered or threatened species are
involved, or if designated or proposed critical
habitat are present, the airport operator must
prepare a biological assessment of the impacts
of the wildlife hazard management plan on
these species or habitats (FAA 2004, Cleary and
Dolbeer 2005).
The FAA has issued ≥2 advisory circulars
(FAA Advisory Circulars 2004) concerning
wildlife and airports, actively encouraging
the reporting of wildlife strikes and providing
guidance on certain land uses that have the
potential to attract wildlife on or near publicuse airports (FAA 2004, Cleary and Dolbeer
2005).

Regulatory implications

Wildlife often is protected by overlapping
federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and
ordinances (Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Airport
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managers must have a clear understanding of
the responsibilities placed on them by these
various restrictions. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) has management authority for
migratory birds and federally listed threatened
and endangered wildlife species and has been
given the primary regulatory responsibilities
for such species and their habitat (FAA 2004,
Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Airport operators
must know when to consult with FWS and obtain
required permits prior to modifying designated
or proposed critical habitat, taking wildlife (i.e.,
killing, removing eggs or relocating chicks),
and harassing animals or excluding them (i.e.,
minimizing exposed areas that birds can use
for perching and nesting; Cleary and Dolbeer
2005). Currently, no method exists to obtain an
FWS permit to remove American bald eagle
(Haliaeetus leucocephalus) nests, eggs, or chicks.
The regulatory authority for resident
nonmigratory birds rests with the various
state wildlife management agencies. States
also may list certain wildlife as threatened or
endangered that are not considered as such
at the federal level (Cleary and Dolbeer 2005).
Airport operators must first obtain a state
depredation permit to take state-protected
species or game birds outside the legal hunting
season or beyond the established bag limits
(Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). In August 2007,
when FWS de-listed the American bald eagle
from the threatened and endangered species
list, the state of Florida followed suit and also
de-listed the bald eagle. However, the Florida
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
has since adopted a bald eagle management
plan that requires airport operators to obtain a
bald eagle nest removal permit. It is doubtful,
however, that such a permit will be issued until
FWS adopts a similar management plan for the
bald eagle. It is important that airport operators
understand that the American bald eagle is still
protected by the Bald and Golden Eagle Act
of 1940, as amended in 1978, but this act has
no provisions for permits of any kind. Given
the ever-changing and conflicting regulatory
environment, there is great potential for airport
managers to become confused over this issue.
The old adage that ignorance of the law is
no excuse must weigh heavily on the airport
manager’s decisions for action.
Airport managers must still secure harass-
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ment permits from the FWS and state agencies
that allow only nonlethal methods of harassing
bald eagles by using pyrotechnics (e.g., propane
cannons, sirens, horns). But managers may
not fire pyrotechnics directly at bald eagles.
Accurate records of the methods and results
of harassment must be kept by the airport
manager, and these records must be sent to both
federal and state agencies prior to the renewal
of agency permits. Take- (i.e., kill) permits are
still available to airport operators when it may
be necessary to shoot certain other species as
a control method at airports, but the airport
manager must ensure that required federal and
state wildlife kill-permits are in place and that
accurate records, by species and date, of birds
killed are kept. Further, city permits may be
necessary to discharge a firearm within the city
limits, and all local laws must be adhered to
regarding certain distances of discharges from
buildings and highways (Cleary and Dolbeer
2005).
In some states, such as Florida, water
management districts have jurisdiction over
any habitat modifications that have impacts
on wildlife habitat (especially wetlands). The
airport operator must obtain an environmental
resource permit before altering any viable
wildlife habitat on the airport. If a wetland
habitat is to be modified, it may be necessary to
mitigate unavoidable wetland impacts before
those impacts occur. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (COE) also has jurisdiction over
certain wetlands, and airport managers should
contact a professional wetland consultant
qualified to delineate wetlands before any
modifications are made to airports. If the COE
has jurisdiction, then the airport must obtain a
permit, along with a mitigation strategy, before
any modification to wetlands can be undertaken
(Cleary and Dolbeer 2005).
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has some jurisdiction over endangered
species. In some cases, the airport operator
may wish to use chemical repellents, toxicants,
and drugs to capture wildlife on the airport.
One of the responsibilities of the EPA is the
proper registration of these chemicals that are
permitted through state and local governments
(Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Only certified
applicators (i.e., persons working under a
certified applicator’s direct supervision) may
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purchase and use restricted-use pesticides,
and these are restricted to those uses covered
by the applicator’s certification (Cleary and
Dolbeer 2005). Airport managers must make
absolutely certain that application of these
types of chemicals is in strict compliance with
these rules.
The USDA and the FAA recommend
elimination of any cover required by birds for
resting, roosting, escape, and reproduction
(Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Airport operators
should clear dense stands of trees and
undergrowth on the airport to eliminate food
or cover for wildlife (Seamans et al. 2007,
Washburn et al. 2007, Bernhardt et al. 2009,
Linnell et al. 2009). Airport managers should
check with local jurisdictions to determine if
arbor permits are needed before removing or
trimming trees.
One can thus see that wildlife hazard
management on and around airports is heavily
regulated. The airport manager should require
that training of personnel strictly adheres to
all federal, state, and local regulations, as well
as secure all necessary permits, licensing and
certifications. Failure of the airport manager to
comply with all regulations could be a severe
liability to the airport operator. This liability
could range from the loss of the airport manager’s
job to the possible loss of the airport operating
certificate. Federal and state permits pertaining
to threatened and endangered species, species
of special concern, and species protected by
law contain strict permit conditions. Large civil
fines can be imposed on airport managers who
violate permit conditions. The biggest regulatory
liability that airport managers or airport
directors face is imposition of felony criminal
charges against them for infractions of permit
conditions. For this reason, airport managers
should seek professional assistance from the
USDA/Wildlife Services, FAA staff wildlife
biologist, environmental lawyers, professional
environmental consultants, Audubon Birds
of Prey Center experts, forestry rangers, and
tree removal experts. Ironically, some agency
permits have such severe conditions concerning
criminal prosecution that it is advisable for
the airport manager to refuse the permit and,
of course, disregard the actions for which the
permit was required.
Sanford Airport Authority (SAA), Florida, for
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example, was issued a permit to use paintball
guns to disperse bald eagles, but the SAA
refused to take the risk of accidentally killing an
American bald eagle and returned the permit.
A professional golfer from Orlando is currently
being prosecuted for animal cruelty when he
accidentally hit and killed a hawk with a golf ball
during an instructional video shoot. Imagine the
possibilities if an airport operator accidentally
kills an American bald eagle. Other agencies,
such as state water management districts, COE,
EPA, state environmental protection agencies,
U.S. Food and Drug Administration , and local
departments of cities and counties may take
enforcement action against an airport manager
who fails to secure required permits or licensing
or fails to comply with permit and licensing
conditions.
			

Inadequate public awareness and
support

If bird-strike mitigation efforts involve
environmentally and socially sensitive bird
species (e.g., bald eagles, ospreys [Pandion
haliaetus], sand hill cranes [Grus canadensis],
great blue herons [Ardea herodias]), airport
managers may receive criticism from such
groups as the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club,
and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, as well as from concerned residents.
When these critics call the local newspaper
and television and radio stations, any resulting
adverse media attention will focus on airport
managers and operators. Airport management
must learn to ignore criticism and wellmeaning, but uninformed, journalism and
proceed with the legal responsibility to mitigate
wildlife strikes. If airport managers meet
all of the legal obligations, they will greatly
reduce liability in the event of a tragic crash
due to a bird strike on or near their airport.

Property damage, personal injuries,
and fatalities
Should a plane crash occur on or near an
airport due to a wildlife strike or bird strike, civil
and criminal liability suits due to negligence of
the airport manager and other airport officials
can be devastating to the airport sponsor. Even
if the aircraft does not crash, but rather aborts
takeoff or makes a precautionary landing,
the damage caused by a bird strike can be
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enormous, as the following examples suggest.
(Unless otherwise noted, data are taken from
Cleary and Dolbeer 2005, Wright 2008, and
Dolbeer unpublished data).
•

•

•

•

•

•

On May 25, 2008, a Kalitta Airlines cargo B-747-200 (based in Michigan) struck
a Eurasian kestrel (Falco tinnunculus)
on the takeoff run at Brussels National
Airport. Even though the pilot was
able to stop the takeoff, the aircraft
overran the runway, broke in half and
was destroyed. The B-747 came within
500 m of housing.
On August 23, 2000, a B-747 struck
a flock of geese on the takeoff run at
Philadelphia International Airport.
The B-747 ingested 1 or 2 birds in the
#1 engine, and the high-speed aborted
takeoff resulted in 9 flat tires. The
engine was a total loss, and the repair
cost was $3 million.
On July 24, 2008, an Air Mauritius
aircraft with 241 people on board
caught fire after colliding with a
bird just as it was taking off from the
Delhi, India, airport. “Had the fire
not extinguished in time or the plane
had taken off, it would have definitely
blown up either on ground or midair,” an official said (CAA Airport
News 2008).
On June 9, 2001, an Airbus 300, during
its climb, struck a Canada goose at
700 m above ground level. The goose
was ingested into the #2 engine. A
precautionary landing was made. Cost
to replace the engine was $2 million.
On February 17, 2004, a B-757-200
struck a flock of mallards (Anas
platyrhynchos) on its takeoff run
at Portland International Airport,
Washington. At least 1 bird was
ingested, and a precautionary landing
was made. The cost to replace the
engine was $2.5 million.
On June 24, 2005, an Airbus 310 struck
multiple Philippine ducks (Anas
luzanica) on its takeoff run at Subic
Bay airport, resulting in an aborted
takeoff. The fan blades were badly
damaged, a large section of the nose

•

cowl was torn from the nacelle (i.e.,
exterior protective covering), and the
fan cowling was damaged. Engine
shrapnel damaged the #3 flap fairing.
The cost to repair the damage was
$9,456,000.
On March 22, 2006, an Airbus 319
struck a flock of Canada geese while
it was on its 4-km final approach to
General Mitchell International Airport, Wisconsin. One or 2 geese were
ingested, and the engine shut down.
The pilot reported an emergency and
was able to land safely. There was
major damage to the engine’s core,
and the engine was replaced at a cost
of $2,675,600.

Damage to general aviation aircraft and
helicopters also can be costly.
•

•

•

On August 17, 2005, a Cessna 421
descending to 600 m above ground
level, struck a black vulture (Coragyps
atratus) at Merritt Island, Florida.
The collision ripped the aircraft wing
causing fuel to spray out and damage
the landing gear recognition light,
so the pilot was not sure if the gear
was down. The Florida Secretary of
Transportation was on board along
with other dignitaries.
On September 1, 2005, a Falcon 20
struck a flock of mourning doves
(Zenaida macroura) shortly after rotation
at Lorain County, Ohio, causing the #1
engine to flame out. As the gear was
retracted, the plane hit another flock,
which caused the #2 engine revolutions
to roll back. The pilot crash-landed,
sliding through a ditch and an airport
perimeter fence, crossing a road, and
coming to a stop in a cornfield. Both
pilots were taken to the hospital. Costs
totaled $1.4 million.
On December 30, 2005, a Bell 206
helicopter was at 150 m above ground
level near Washington, Louisiana,
when it stuck a large vulture (Cathartes
aura) that crashed into the windshield,
temporarily blinding the pilot. The
pilot tried to land in a bean field, but the
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bird’s blood hampered his vision. The
left skid hit the ground first, causing
the aircraft to tip on its side. The pilot
had several surgeries to repair his face,
teeth and eye. The cost to repair the
helicopter was $1.5 million.
Liability for damage from bird strikes is not,
of course, limited to destruction of aircraft
or persons on board. In many instances, the
aircraft may crash into either a busy highway or
occupied buildings, and the devastation from
the initial impact and sometimes horrendous
fires can be catastrophic. Even if no injuries or
fatalities occur, the financial liability for damage
to structures or vehicles on the ground can be
tremendous.
•

•

On August 27, 2000, a B-747, during its
climb out of Los Angeles International
Airport, struck a western gull (Larus
occidentalis) at 150 m above ground
level. The jet engine ingested the gull,
and the pilot made an emergency
landing with the jet spewing 3- to
4-m-long flames. Three pieces of the
engine fell to the ground, with one
2-m piece landing on a beach where
people were having a cookout (luckily
no one was injured). The pilot dumped
75 metric tons of fuel over the ocean
before landing.
On February 26, 1973, a Learjet 24
departing from Peachtree-Dekalb
Airport, Georgia, struck a flock of
brown-headed cowbirds (Molothrus
ater). Engine failure resulted, and the
aircraft crashed, killing 8 people and
seriously injuring 1 person on the
ground.

•

•

•

•

A more serious liability (both emotionally and
financially) is a crash on or near the airport that
involves serious injuries or fatalities to people
both onboard the aircraft and on the ground.
•

On July 8, 2003, a Cessna 172 struck a
vulture at 250 m above ground level
near McKinney, Texas. The pilot made
a Mayday call to the airport tower
after the bird struck the left wing,
announcing that he could not keep

•

the aircraft straight with the power
on and that he was going to land in a
field. The plane came to rest upright
with the engine separated from the
firewall. The left wing was separated
at the wing attach points, and the fuel
tanks had ruptured and were leaking.
Witnesses on the ground saw the
plane hit with left wing first; 2 people
on board were killed.
On July 8, 2007, a Cessna 182 swerved
to avoid an eagle at 20 m above ground
level on its approach to Matinicus
Island, Maine. The plane hit the
treetops near the runway and crashed,
destroying the aircraft and injuring 2
people.
On October 23, 2007, a Piper 44
disappeared on a night-training flight
at 1,000 m above ground level out of
Browerville, Minnesota. The instructor
and student pilot did not report any
difficulties, but wreckage was found
36 hours later, partially submerged
upside down in a bog. From part of
a wing and some remains inside, the
Smithsonian Institution, Division of
Birds, identified the bird that struck the
left horizontal stabilizer as a Canada
goose. Both pilots were killed.
In March 2008, a Citation II, departing
from the Wiley Post, Oklahoma, airport
during its ascent, struck a number of
unidentified birds. A witness heard
a series of bangs and observed the jet
trailing smoke and plunge straight
down into the ground. All 5 people on
board were killed on impact (Birdstrike
News 2008).
In October 2007, the University of
North Dakota’s twin-engine Seminole
trainer was en route at about 1,200 m
above ground level when it struck a
flock of Canada geese. The airplane
had multiple impact points and
crashed into a swamp, killing both
crew members (Birdstrike News
2008).
On May 25, 2000, a Cessna 310 climbing
out of L. M. Clayton Airport, Montana,
collided with several Canada geese
at 183 m above ground level. The
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windshield was shattered, and the
right wing and fuel tank were ripped
off on impact, destroying the aircraft
in a post-crash fire. The pilot was
hospitalized with burns and lacerations.

•

Civil lawsuits

Many civil lawsuits have been filed, citing
the negligence of airport managers and airport
operators contributing to property loss,
serious injuries, and fatalities after a bird strike
attributed aircraft incident on or near airports.
•

•

A significant court precedent was
established when a Learjet 24 crashed
on departure from Peachtree-Dekalb
Airport, Georgia, in 1973. The plane
crashed after striking a flock of
cowbirds; 8 people were killed, and 1
person on the ground was seriously
injured. The crash generated a lengthy
legal case, called the Miree litigation.
The court determined that the airport
manager could be held liable for failing
to take the precautions possible at his
level of authority to end bird hazards
(Michael 1986).
On November 12, 1975, a DC 10
ingested several gulls into the #3
engine during the takeoff run at John
F. Kennedy International Airport. The
engine caught fire; several wheels and
tires disintegrated, and the landing
gear collapsed during the aborted
takeoff. The aircraft then caught
fire and was destroyed; 30 of the
139 passengers and crew (all airline
employees being ferried overseas) were
injured, but there were no fatalities.
The National Transportation Safety
Board noted that ineffective control of
bird hazards by the airport was one of
the factors contributing to the incident.
A complex legal battle in federal and
state courts ensued in 1979, with the
airline and the aircraft owner suing the
FAA, the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, New York City, and
several aerospace companies. The total
settlement, reached in 1985, exceeded
$15 million. Amounts paid by each
party and their insurance companies
were undisclosed.

•

•

On September 22, 1995, an AWACS
B-707 out of Elmendorf Air Force Base,
Alaska, ingested 4 Canada geese into
the #1 and #2 engines during takeoff. The
resulting crash killed all 24 people on
board. Investigators found the “worst
possible combination of operational
conditions,” including infrequent
and inadequate wildlife patrols. The
senior tower controller was reported
by witnesses as saying he “observed
geese lift off and turn directly into the
path of the aircraft.” Both controllers
on duty at the time of the accident
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights
to remain silent, but the investigator
concluded that both controllers “had
a duty to warn the flight crew and
that failure was a contributing factor."
After the investigation, people in the
top 3 leadership positions at the air
base were reassigned.
On June 3, 1995, an Air France
Concorde, while landing at John
F. Kennedy International Airport,
ingested 1 or 2 Canada geese into the
#3 engine at about 3 m above ground
level. This caused an uncontained
failure. Shrapnel from the #3 engine
destroyed the #4 engine and cut
hydraulic lines and control cables. The
pilot made a successful emergency
landing, but damage to the Concorde
was >$7 million. The French Aviation
Authority sued the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey and
eventually settled out of court for $5.3
million.
On June 7, 1989, a TNT Air Cargo
BAE 146 departing Genoa Airport,
Italy, at night flew through a flock of
gulls at rotation. Three engines were
damaged, but the pilot managed to
return the severely damaged aircraft
to the airport. The carrier sued a
number of entities for damages. The
Civil Court of Genoa in 2001, after 11
years of litigation, awarded the carrier
$2 million. Liability was assigned as
50% to the Ministry of Transport, 30%
to the private company operating the
airport, and 20% to the port authority.
(Battistoni 2003).
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•

•

•
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On December 12, 1973, a Falcon
Business Jet with 9 people on board
struck common gulls (Larus canus) and
black-headed gulls (Chroicocephalus
ridibundus) on takeoff from Norwich
Airport, England. One minor injury
resulted from the crash, which
destroyed the aircraft. The judge
presiding over the case wrote that
the airport operator owed the aircraft
operator and occupants the “common
duty of care." The judge decided that
the airport operator failed to show due
diligence in managing the airport’s bird
hazards, and there must be judgment
for the aircraft operator (Michael 1986,
MacKinnon et al. 2001).
On June 14, 1975, a Sabreliner ingested
gulls in both engines at rotation from
Watertown Airport, South Dakota.
The aircraft crashed, and a severe fire
ensued, injuring 3 of the 6 people on
board and destroying the aircraft.
When a suit was brought against the
airport operator, the court maintained
that the proximate cause of the crash
was the failure to warn the pilot of the
presence of birds. Judgment for the
full value of the destroyed aircraft was
entered against the airport operator
(Michael 1986, MacKinnon et al.
2001).
When a B-737 ingested a gull and
aborted the takeoff at Pula, Croatia, the
airline sent a bill to the airport, which
the airport refused to pay, stating that
it “had a permanent (NOTAM) [i.e.,
notice to airmen] to warn air carriers
of birds in the vicinity of the runway.
When the insurance company sued the
airport, the appeals court ruled in favor
of the insurance company. The court
noted that the airport acknowledged
that a problem existed by having a
permanent NOTAM regarding bird
hazards, and yet failed to undertake
all measures at its disposal to alleviate
the hazard (Pula County Court 2000).
When an Air France A-320 hit a
flock of gulls during the takeoff run
at Marseille Provence, France, the
engine was destroyed. In January 2005
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the airline was awarded $4 million
because of negligence in operating the
airfield. A hedgehog (Erinacedae sp.)
had been struck by an earlier flight
(which attracted the gulls), but airport
operations personnel had failed to
remove the carcass.

Criminal charges
Criminal negligence charges can be brought
against airport managers, some as serious as
involuntary manslaughter when fatalities are
involved from a bird-strike crash on or near an
airport.
•

•

On January 20, 1995, a Falcon 20
struck a flock of birds during takeoff
from Le Bourget Airport, France. The
jet ingested birds in the left engine,
causing the aircraft to crash, killing all
10 people on board. An investigation
found that the airport staff failed
to perform routine bird-scaring
operations prior to the crash. In 1998,
French authorities laid charges for
involuntary manslaughter against the
Paris Airport Authority and 3 former
officers for their roles in the accident.
The airport authority was accused of
“negligently failing to follow normal
security procedures” (MacKinnon et
al. 2001, Cleary and Dolbeer 2005).
When a U.S. Air Force AWACS B-707
engine ingesting geese and crashed in
Alaska, killing all 24 people on board,
the senior controller and another
controller at the tower had to invoke
their Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent when investigated for their part
in the crash.

Conclusion

The courts have ruled that airport operators
must exercise due diligence in undertaking
all measures at their disposal to alleviate bird
hazards at airports. Failing to do so could
bring civil judgments and criminal charges
upon airport managers and operators. When
civil suits and criminal charges are filed, court
cases can drag out through the court system
for years. Court costs, attorney fees, and expert
fees can cost the airport manager and operator
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millions of dollars in defense fees and settlement
judgments.
To avoid potential liability issues, airport
managers and operators must:
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